Introduction
In the last two decades, labor market search models have been used extensively to understand aggregate labor market phenomena, such as equilibrium unemployment and vacancies (Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) , Pissarides (2000) ). This theoretical framework also proved to be useful in analyzing the e¤ects of various labor market policies including unemployment insurance and labor turnover costs. However, search models have recently been criticized for their business cycle implications. In particular, Shimer (2005a) and Hall (2005) argue that standard models of labor market search require implausibly large shocks to generate substantial variation in key variables; unemployment, vacancies and market tightness (vacancy to unemployment ratio) 1 . Standard deviations of unemployment and vacancies are 10 times, market tightness is 19 times as large as the standard deviation of the average product per worker in the U.S. A puzzle arises since a standard calibration of Mortensen-Pissarides model implies that the variations in all these variables is basically the same as productivity.
This paper studies ampli…cation of productivity shocks in labor markets through on-thejob-search. Nagypal (2004a) and Shimer (2005b) argue that job-to-job transitions are crucial for the cyclical worker reallocation. Exploiting dependent interviewing methods introduced in the CPS in 1994, Fallick and Fleischman (2004) …nd that these ‡ows are large: On average 2.6% of employed workers change employers each month. Moreover, job-to-job transitions turn out to be signi…cantly procyclical. This particular ‡ow cannot be analyzed by standard search models. Thus, on-the-job search seems to be a natural extension of the standard labor market search model.
In the model, workers are allowed to search for another job while employed without incurring any cost. There is also symmetric incomplete information about the quality of the match, which provides persistent employment relationships and a rationale for on-the-job search. Thus, workers in low quality matches have an incentive to search for and accept better quality matches.
In equilibrium, workers are distributed over di¤erent match qualities at any point in time. Ampli…cation arises in the model because productivity changes not only a¤ect …rms'probability of contacting unemployed workers but also of contacting already employed workers. For instance, in expansions, …rms are more likely to meet employed workers and those they meet are more likely to accept …rm's job o¤er because they are more likely to be employed in a low quality match. This provides the incentive for the …rms to post more vacancies than predicted in the standard model. The logic behind this is simple; since higher productivity raises the value of all matches, even low quality matches become productive enough to survive in expansions.
Therefore the measure of workers in low quality matches is greater when productivity is high, implying a higher probability of switching to another match. This introduces strongly procyclical labor market reallocation through procyclical job-to-job transitions. Therefore, the e¤ects of productivity shocks on employment distribution play a key role in generating the desired ampli…cation.
One other contribution of on-the-job search that helps to create ampli…cation is the presence of larger stock of job seekers. In the standard labor market search model, a positive productivity shock leads to higher number of vacancies and lower unemployment by increasing the job …nding rate. As the productivity shock persists, since all new workers come from the unemployment pool, …rms will expect to …nd increasingly less number of unemployed workers to …ll in the available vacancies. This dampens the positive e¤ect of productivity shock on the supply of vacancies. With on-the-job search, however, this o¤setting e¤ect will not be present. To the contrary, due to a substantial number of employed workers at low quality matches who are ready to switch, …rms have incentives to post additional vacancies.
The model provides a possible channel for ampli…cation that does not require changing the wage determination process or the information structure to a large extent. In particular, simulations show that the standard deviations for all three labor market variables are matched. The model also successfully predicts that market tightness, de…ned as the ratio of vacancies to unemployment, is more volatile than both vacancies and unemployment. In addition, the presence of endogenous separation is reconciled with the negative correlation between unemployment and vacancies over business cycle frequencies.
This paper also has a computational contribution. On-the-job search with match heterogeneity implies that the entire employment distribution becomes a state variable for the recursive problem. It is well known in the literature that this complicates the numerical solu-tion of the equilibrium. I utilize the algorithm used by Krusell and Smith (1998) to address a similar problem. The computational exercise suggests that approximating the worker's acceptance probability of a …rm's job o¤er su¢ ces to characterize the equilibrium. This enables me to numerically solve for the stochastic equilibrium of this economy. In contrast, other studies that modeled on-the-job search either used some simplifying assumptions to get rid of the endogenous e¤ects of heterogeneity or simply restricted the analysis to non-stochastic equilibrium.
The next section discusses the related literature. Section 3 describes the U.S. aggregate labor market data. It shows that the variation in average labor productivity is much less than the observed variation in vacancies, unemployment and market tightness. This section also includes some results from a simulation of the standard labor market search model in order to quantify the size of the "ampli…cation puzzle". Section 4 describes the economic environment and lays out the dynamic optimization problem of agents. Section 5 characterizes the equilibrium of the economy and describes the computational procedure to handle the presence of the employment distribution in the state space. Section 6 and Section 7 discuss calibration and the solution to the computational problem in detail respectively. Section 8 presents the results from the simulation of the model and discusses the implications of the model.
Related Literature
Early studies of labor market search either failed to address the magnitude of the exogenous forcing process (Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) , Cole and Rogerson (1999) ) or implied counterfactually positive relationship between unemployment and vacancies (Andolfatto (1996), Merz (1995), Ramey and Watson (1997) ). Shimer (2005a) and Hall (2005) claim that the reason for the lack of ampli…cation in these models is the underlying wage determination mechanism. In search models, an increase in labor productivity raises the labor demand, hence the number of vacancies posted by …rms.
Since labor markets match vacancies and unemployment as an increasing function of both, more vacancies increase the job-…nding probability of workers. Higher job-…nding probability reduces unemployment, implying a negative relationship between vacancies and unemployment.
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However, since workers are now hired at a higher pace, unemployment duration also falls in addition to unemployment. This raises the workers' threat point in bargaining and leads to an o¤setting change in terms of higher wages. Therefore, …rms'incentive to create vacancies falls (Shimer (2005a) , p. [25] [26] . Hall (2004 Hall ( , 2005 , Shimer (2004) and Kennan (2004) build on this presumption and introduce wage rigidity either exogenously or through an endogenous mechanism. As I argue in this paper, a modi…cation to the wage mechanism is not a necessary condition for ampli…cation. Indeed, a recent paper by Mortensen and Nagypal (2005) discusses this point extensively, suggesting that wage rigidity per se is not the answer for ampli…cation.
For instance, assuming no bargaining strength for workers leads to constant wages that are equal to the reservation wage ( i.e. the value of leisure). Even in this case, the variability of labor market variables relative to productivity are an order of magnitude smaller (Mortensen and Nagypal (2005) , p.9).
Several recent studies also aim to provide a mechanism to amplify the e¤ects of business cycle shocks on unemployment and vacancies (Hagedorn and costs. Krause and Lubik (2004) and are closer to this paper in that both model on-the job search. In general on-the-job search introduces the heterogeneity of job seekers into the picture. Coupled with the aggregate uncertainty, this complicates the problem to a great extent. This might be the reason why Krause and Lubik (2004) assumes a segregated market for di¤erent kind of jobs to simplify the potential complexity of the model, whereas only restricts the analysis to non-stochastic equilibrium. In contrast, I handle the heterogeneity that is induced through on-the-job search so that the stochastic equilibrium of the model could be studied.
U.S. Labor Market Facts
This section presents some of the salient features of the U.S. aggregate labor market data over the business cycle to motivate the questions addressed in the paper. I focus on three key 5 labor market variables; unemployment, vacancies and market tightness as de…ned by the ratio of vacancies to unemployment. These are standard variables describing the state of the labor market. Since the mechanism emphasized in this paper also has implications for transitions between di¤erent labor market states, I present two series that proxy transition probabilities between unemployment and employment. These measures are recently constructed by Shimer (2005a and 2005b) .
Unemployment is the quarterly average of seasonally adjusted monthly data constructed by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) using the Current Population Survey (CPS) data.
Vacancies are proxied by quarterly averages of the seasonally adjusted monthly Help-Wanted Advertising Index constructed by the Conference Board. The index is normalized to 100 for 1987. Market tightness variable is constructed using these two and equals the ratio of unemployment to vacancies. In order to determine productivity changes over the cycle, I use real output per person in the non-farm business sector. This particular series is chosen to ensure comparability with the recent body of literature. It is also a natural way to think about productivity in the standard Mortensen-Pissarides model. This series is part of BLS's Major Sector Productivity and Costs program. It is normalized to 100 for 1992.
Job …nding and separation probabilities describe the hazard of changing labor market state.
For instance, job …nding probability is the hazard rate for an unemployed worker of …nding a job. Hence, it gives the probability of switching between state of unemployment (u) to state of employment (e). The opposite of this measure is separation probability (e-u transition).
Shimer uses short term unemployment data and total unemployment data to pin down these probabilities 2 . Let U t be the number of unemployed in month t, U s t be the number of workers unemployed less than a month in month t; and E t be the number of workers employed in month t. Then, job …nding and separation probabilities are constructed by the following two formulas respectively.
The separation probability takes into account the possibility of having a short spell of employment in a month to get rid of the time aggregation bias. All of the data reported here are expressed as quarterly averages of monthly data, except the average labor productivity, these two …gures that job …nding probability is strongly procyclical and separation probability is countercyclical. These …ndings are summarized in Table 1 . The second row denotes the variables of interest: u for unemployment, v for vacancies, v/u for market tightness, u-e for job …nding probability, e-u for separation probability and z for labor productivity. The third row in the table states standard deviations of these variables and the fourth row gives one period auto correlations. Ampli…cation of productivity shocks is clear from the third row.
Both unemployment and vacancies are 10 times more volatile than labor productivity. Market tightness is even more volatile, approximately 19 times more. The ampli…cation puzzle, which motivates this paper, states that the standard labor market search model cannot generate this much ampli…cation based on a productivity process that resembles z in the data. In order to compare data …ndings in Table 1 with the implications of the model, I simulate a standard Mortensen-Pissarides model. Since, this model is well known in the literature, details of it is presented in the Appendix (see Pissarides (2000) for an extensive treatment of the model and its implications). (Tauchen, 1986) . As Table 2 clearly indicates, the standard model implies almost the same magnitude of variation in all key variables. There is virtually no ampli…cation. Third rows of Table 1 and Table 2 make this point clear beyond doubt. This discrepancy between the model's implications and the data is referred to as ampli…cation puzzle in this paper. One key feature of the data is that separations show a countercyclical variation. This is clearly evident in Figure ? ? and The negative relationship between unemployment and vacancies has long been recognized by researchers. Indeed, one of the key facts that the standard model was intended to explain was this negative correlation, which has been traditionally named as the Beveridge Curve. The U.S. Beveridge Curve is shown in Figure ? ?. This relationship is also apparent in Table 1 in the form of a strong negative correlation of 0:89. Finally, the U.S. data indicates that most of the variations in unemployment and vacancies are due to more variable job …nding probabilities. The arti…cial probability series constructed by using (1) and (2) indicate that, it is the hiring which varies more over the cycle. The standard deviation of the job …nding probability is almost two times greater than that of separations. Their cyclical variations are presented in Figures ?? and ? ?. Although on-thejob search introduced in this paper implies another possible transition, namely e-e transition, these probabilities are still useful benchmarks to compare.
The Economic Environment
The model I present here is an extended version of Pries and Rogerson (2005) . They study implications of di¤erent labor market institutions on hiring policies and labor market ‡ows.
Their model incorporates symmetric incomplete information into the standard search model.
Symmetric incomplete information motivates agents to learn about their match quality over time by observing idiosyncratic component of their output. This mechanism causes persistent idiosyncratic match speci…c productivity. Alternatively, one could assume a slightly more complicated persistent exogenous process that governs idiosyncratic component of matches.
However, as Nagypal (2004b) argues, learning about match quality is the key determinant of match speci…c capital especially after …rst few months of tenure. Hence, learning about match quality provides an empirically relevant story about productivity changes over the job. In addition, I add two key features to this model to explain the ampli…cation puzzle: On-the-job search and aggregate uncertainty.
There is a continuum of risk neutral workers and employers who discount the future at the rate 2 (0; 1). The measure of workers is normalized to 1. Workers and employers come together in a labor market which is characterized by search frictions.
Learning and Production Technology
Employers are endowed with a production technology that produces y t 2 Y = fy h ; y l jy h > y l g R ++ when matched with a worker. Hence, when a worker and a …rm form a productive match, they produce z t y t ; which depends on the inherent match quality and aggregate state, z t . Aggregate productivity is governed by a Markov process, (z t+1 jz t ) and is independent of the idiosyncratic component. Even though both workers and …rms observe the match speci…c component of the output, y t ; and the aggregate state, they do not observe their actual match quality, q; which can be good or bad. Match speci…c output is determined by the following relationship 3 :
Though q is unobservable, agents receive an initial signal 0 2 [0; 1] that corresponds to the probability that the match will be good if formed. It is same for both the worker and the …rm. This initial signal is received from a truncated normal distribution, i.e 0 s ( ; ) 4 .
This distribution is time invariant. After the initial period, both parties start learning abouth their match quality based on output realizations. Since there is no asymmetric information and the output is observed by both, they will have the same posterior belief about the match quality. Let Pr(q = gjy t 1 ) = denote this probability that the current match is a good match conditional on the past output realization on the match, y t 1 . Agents need to infer Pr(q = gjy t ) and Pr(q = bjy t ) for y t 2 fy h ; y l g. At this point, it may be useful to compute the posteriors. It follows from simple Bayesian inference.
Pr(q = gjy t = y) = Pr(q = gjy t 1 ) Pr(y t = yjq = g) Pr(q = gjy t 1 ) Pr(y t = yjq = g) + Pr(q = bjy t 1 ) Pr(y t = Y yjq = b)
After some algebra, I arrive at the following posteriors implied by prior belief, , and time t output realization.
The posterior is updated to h after observing a high output and to l after low output.
Intuitively, h is expected to be higher than the current state . More formally, the current state is related to the future state in the following way under (3).
Remark 1
If (3) holds; h ( ) l ( ) and both h ( ) and l ( ) are increasing in . In addition, h ( ) is concave whereas l ( ) is convex 5 .
This remark summarizes the information revelation process over time. An important feature of this learning mechanism is that it rules out any strategic action by both parties to in ‡uence the learning process. The evolution of the beliefs is entirely governed by the exogenous process de…ned in (3) and (4) 6 . As the …rm receives high output realizations, its anticipation that the match is indeed of good quality increases. The opposite is true for a …rm that keeps receiving low output realizations. Furthermore, the higher the initial prior about the match quality, the higher the next period's state variable.
Finally for simplicity, I refer to the unconditional probability of observing a high output (low output) at each period as (1 ) in the rest of the paper. They are simply de…ned as linear functions of :
The presence of match speci…c productivity implies that all matches are indexed by their quality ( ) at any point in time. This requires a way of describing the heterogeneity at any point in time. A mapping that gives the measure of the employment at any subset of the 5 The fact that these two mappings are increasing in could be established by the positive sign of the …rst derivatives. Also, comparing h ; l and ; one can easily establish that h ( ) l ( ) is true. Concavity of h ( ) and convexity of l ( ) follow from these arguments and the fact that both h and l maps [0; 1] to itself. 6 This exogenous process dictated by learning for the evolution of match speci…c output can be thought of as any exogenous persistent match speci…c productivity shock where the state space and the transition probabilities are de…ned appropriately. For instance, a process for this match speci…c component may take values ranging from (0)y h + (1 (0))y l to (1)y h + (1 (1))y l and the transition probability from the current state to the future state might be de…ned as Pr( h j ) = ( ) and Pr( l j ) = 1 ( ).
match quality state space is a natural way of describing this heterogeneity. Let
be the total number of matches that are believed to be good quality with probability . Since, each match employs one worker, this also gives the total number of employed workers with match quality index . I also assume that agents are rational in their expectations. In other words, fraction of all matches among n t ( ) are actually good quality. How this distribution evolves over time depends both on the endogenous decisions made by agents and the equation of motion for aggregate productivity. I assume that this is summarized by a function G such that:
In the discussion of the equilibrium, employment distribution and (5) plays a critical role.
Matching Technology and Wage Determination
The meeting process is facilitated by an aggregate matching function, which maps the number of searchers on both sides of the market into meetings. Since this paper focuses on the importance of the match quality distribution on reallocation over business cycles, search e¤ort will be ignored. This is not an unusual assumption in labor market search models, where search input into the matching function is generally approximated by the number of unemployed. Due to on-the-job search in this paper, search input is approximated by the measure of all searchers, which equals the entire labor force 7 . The fact that both employed and unemployed workers meet a vacancy this does not imply that employed workers …nd jobs at the same rate as unemployed workers do. Idiosyncratic match quality generates endogenously di¤erent matching rates for all workers.
The matching technology is summarized by a constant returns to scale matching function,
, that takes the amount of job seekers, 1, and vacancies, v t as its arguments 8 . This implies that the rate at which workers meet a job opportunity is f (v t ) = M (v t ; 1)=1. Similarly, a vacancy will meet a worker at the rate h(v t ) = M (v t ; 1)=v t . The meeting rate is not equal to matching rate in this model, because not all meetings end as successful matches. There are two possible types of meetings in this framework; meetings between an unemployed worker and a vacancy, and meetings between an employed worker and a vacancy. Meetings between an unemployed worker and a vacant …rm turns into productive matches if their common beliefs about the match quality are above a certain threshold, which is to be determined endogenously in the equilibrium. When an already employed worker meets a vacancy, she has to decide whether to stay in her current match. This decision depends not only on the possible quality of the prospective match (if formed), but also on the quality of her existing match. Agents' initial signal about the quality of the potential match is also drawn from . As a result, if the worker quits and changes her job, the …rm becomes idle and can choose to post a vacancy next period.
For simplicity, I assume that there is no recall of past job o¤ers and no wage bidding by …rms to attract a worker. Incorporating a strategic interaction between a worker's current employer and a potential employer might change the results presented here at the expense of complicating the wage determination mechanism. This simplifying assumption is not uncommon in the literature . Furthermore, this paper aims to provide a mechanism for ampli…cation through the e¤ects of labor market search on the entire employment distribution but not on wage determination.
The …rm pays a wage that is determined by a sharing rule over the match surplus which is common in the literature 9 . The sharing rule is such that workers keep 2 (0; 1) fraction of the match surplus whereas …rms get (1 ) of it. Wages are renegotiated each period by splitting the surplus with the same rule. This does not preclude persistence in wages because inherent match quality, , and aggregate productivity, z, are both persistent. Under these assumptions about wage determination, it is clear that a worker already employed in a match with probability of being a good match is willing to switch to a new employer if she faces a higher initial signal. Thus, she experiences a job-to-job transition if new signal, 0 , is greater than the current match quality, i.e. 0 > 10 . If the current employment distribution is n t , then the probability that an employed worker, conditional on meeting, is willing to switch jobs is a function of this distribution:
This is the essential feature of the model that introduces the employment distribution into the state space.
Finally, the alternative to a match for a …rm is posting a vacancy , which costs c > 0 units of consumption per period and generates a possibility of a new match in the next period.
Firms have incentive to post vacancy as long as the value of posting one is positive. This is ensured by the free entry of …rms and implies that equilibrium value of vacancy is driven to zero. For workers, the outside option is to be unemployed and to consume b > 0, which could be interpreted as unemployment bene…ts or value of leisure. This implies that ongoing matches are destroyed endogenously when the match surplus becomes negative. Because of the particular sharing rule I use, such a decision does not create any disagreements, i.e. both parties agree to end the match jointly. In the equilibrium, this implies a reservation prior, :
below which the match ceases to be productive and dissolves. On the other hand, a worker may unilaterally end a match, if she meets another vacancy and gets a better initial match quality signal. As explained in the previous paragraph, …rms should take the possibility of such a decision into account when they are in a match. Hence, on-the-job search introduces possible match destruction, even though the surplus of the match is strictly positive. Matches are also subject to an exogenous shock in each period that renders the match unproductive. This probability is denoted by 11 .
Timing of Events
It would be instructive to describe the timing of events within a period to understand agents' information set at each point in time. Events with a time period follows the sequence below, which is also depicted in a chart at the end of the paper:
values for such costs it does not eliminate job-to-job transitions, hence the mechanism underlined in this paper.
Matches that were productive in the last period start the period t with the information, t ; z t and n t . Unemployed workers and vacant …rms start the period with z t and n t .
Workers and …rms within a match decide whether to stay or exit the match. Because of the surplus sharing rule, there is no disagreement between two parties.
-If the decision is to stay, production occurs, y t is realized. Workers consume wages, …rm consumes net output. Match quality is updated to t+1 :
-If the decision is to exit, worker becomes an unemployed searcher and consumes b.
Firm becomes idle.
After production, match quality distribution changes to n + t , which is di¤erent from n t due to learning and endogenous separations.
Firms decide to post vacancy at the cost of c until the value of a vacant position is driven to zero. This pins down the total number of vacancies, v t .
Meetings occur according to M (v t ; 1), and initial signals are drawn from .
-Employed worker who meets a vacancy quits and changes her job if the new signal indicates a higher quality match. This decision is unilateral.
-Unemployed worker who meets a vacancy decides whether to form a match or stay unemployed.
New matches are formed, which will be productive in t + 1. Existing matches are subject to exogenous destruction with probability .
Match quality distribution is updated to n t+1 .
Bellman Equations
In order to de…ne the equilibrium of this economy, I start with the Bellman equations that determine values of being in di¤erent labor market states. State variables for agents form a list f ; z; ng, where n is the aggregate employment distribution and time subscripts are dropped for convenience. Aggregate state variables z and n are not correlated with the law of motion for the individual state variable ; since the learning process is independent of the aggregate state 12 . Equation of motion for is given by posteriors de…ned in (4), whereas that of z is governed by the Markov process. The part of the law of motion that concerns n( ) is denoted by G such that n 0 = G(n; z; z 0 ), where the variables with " 0 " denote one period ahead variables.
Knowing the aggregate state allows agents to predict future meeting rates.
Let V u (z; n) be the value of being unemployed for a worker when aggregate productivity is z and the employment distribution is n.
An unemployed worker consumes b in this period and expects to come up with a possible match with probability f (v), in which case, she gets the value of having a match, denoted by V e ( 0 ; z 0 ; n 0 ). Alternatively, she will stay unemployed with probability 1 f (v). Expectation operator takes (z 0 jz) into account and n 0 is governed by G(n; z; z 0 ).
The value of having a match which is of good quality with probability is slightly more complicated.
V e ( ; z; n) = max
w( ; z; n)
The worker compares the returns on retaining the match and not accepting or dissolving it.
First …ve terms within the maximum operator de…ne the discounted expected value of forming (or staying with) the match. Current return from the match equals wage payments, w( ; z; n).
Expected value of staying in the match has three components. First, the worker might not meet another vacancy with probability (1 )(1 f (v)) and stay with her current employer. In this case, depending on the current output realization, she will update her belief about the quality of the match according to (4) . Since a high output is realized with probability ( ), the expected future value of the match becomes V e ( h ; z 0 ; n 0 ). Alternatively, a low output realization leads to a lower posterior and a corresponding expected future value of being in a match, V e ( l ; z 0 ; n 0 ). 
Worker's choice between her current match and the new vacancy is determined similarly. Finally, the match might exogenously dissolve due to an exogenous shock with probability .
Firm's problem could be de…ned in terms of Bellman equations in a similar fashion. Let J u (z; n) and J e ( ; z; n) be values of having a vacant job and being in a match respectively.
Posting a vacancy costs c per period and ensures that the …rm will meet a worker in the next period with probability h(v). Conditional on meeting with a worker, …rm ends up forming a match with probability , which is a function of the employment distribution and is de…ned in detail in the following section.
On the other hand, the position might stay vacant either because the contacted worker does not accept the match (with probability h(v)(1 )) or the position could not meet any worker at all (with probability 1 h(v)).
J e ( ; z; n) = max
z( ( )y h + (1 ( ))y l ) w( ; z; n)
A …rm that starts the current period with a match that is of good quality with probability
; has to decide whether to go on with this arrangement and pay w( ; z; n) to the worker or destroy the match (or not start the match at all). In the latter case, payo¤ to the …rm is simply the value of being a vacant job. Current return from the match to the …rm is the expected net output which is de…ned as z( ( )y h + (1 ( ))y l ) w( ; z; n). Once the …rm stays with this match, worker's possible meetings with new vacancies should be taken into account to determine the discounted expected future value. For instance, the …rm's employee might contact a new vacancy with probability (1 )f (v). When there is no new meeting in the next period, which happens with probability (1 )(1 f (v)), expected value of the current match only depends on how beliefs and the aggregate state change. However, whenever the …rm's employee contacts a new vacant position, the future of the match depends on worker's choice because of the absence of any wage bidding. For instance, a new vacancy is contacted by the worker following a high output with probability (1 )f (v) ( ); and the match will be destroyed (retained) with probability 1 ( h ) ( ( h )). If the current period output turns out to be low, these probabilities change accordingly. Finally, the match may end due to an exogenous shock, leaving the …rm with a vacancy.
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Equilibrium
There are four endogenous decisions to be made by the agents in this economy: Workers'and …rms'decision as to when to destroy an existing match, workers'choice to unilaterally end the match to make a job-to-job transition, …rms'decision on how many vacancies to create and the wage to be paid. Among them the second decision is trivial and has already been substituted in the Bellman equations in the previous section. It simply implies that a worker will not accept any new job match, if the prior about the match speci…c quality in this new o¤er falls below her belief about her current match quality. Hence, in what follows, I focus on the other three decisions.
Let ( ; z; n) denote the optimal decision rule on match formation (and destruction) and v(z; n)
denote the number of vacancies posted in equilibrium as a function of the aggregate state. Then the equilibrium of this economy can be easily de…ned.
De…nition 2 The equilibrium of this economy is a list w( ; z; n); v(z; n); ( ; z; n); J e ( ; z; n); J u (z; n); V e ( ; z; n); V u (z; n) and G(n; z; z 0 ) such that;
1. Given w( ; z; n); v(z; n), ( ; z; n) and G(n; z; z 0 ); value functions satisfy (7)- (10) 2. Given w( ; z; n), v(z; n), G(n; z; z 0 ) and value functions, ( ; z; n) is optimal.
3. (Free entry of …rms) Given w( ; z; n); ( ; z; n); v(z; n)and G(n; z; z 0 ), each …rm posts a vacancy as long as J u (z; n) > 0. Hence, aggregate v(z; n) makes the value of posting a vacancy zero, i.e. J u (z; n) = 0; 8z; n.
(Surplus Sharing) Each period:
and J e ( ; z; n) J u (z; n) = (1 ) [J e ( ; z; n) J u (z; n) + V e ( ; z; n) V u (z; n)].
5. Decision rules w( ; z; n); v(z; n), and ( ; z; n) indeed generate G(n; z; z 0 ) subject to Bayesian updating and equation of motion for z.
The speci…c surplus sharing rule used in this paper implies that both workers and …rms agree to leave when the surplus of the match falls below zero. Surplus of the match is de…ned as the quantity, J e ( ; z; n) J u (z; n) + V e ( ; z; n) V u (z; n). When the match surplus is negative, the 20 share each party gets become negative simultaneously. Hence, in order to describe the decision rule ( ; z; n), it is essential to write down the surplus function. Subtracting outside options from J e ( ; z; n) and V e ( ; z; n); and adding them up leads to an expression de…ning the value of the surplus from a match with quality , in aggregate state z and n. Details of the derivation is presented in the appendix. Let this value be denoted by S( ; z; n). The appendix shows that this surplus function has the following recursive form.
subject to (z 0 jz) and G(n; z; z 0 ). it is easy to show that the decision rule ( ; z; n) takes the following form for a given v.
( ; z; n) = 8 > < > :
The reservation threshold, (z; n), determines whether a match should survive. It also summarizes the hiring decision. In other words, a meeting will turn into a match if the reservation threshold is reached and an ongoing match is terminated if the match quality falls below this threshold. In equilibrium, it turns out that (z; n) is a decreasing function of z.
Intuitively, agents become less willing in recessions to undertake matches that are less probable to be good quality. Since all matches are less productive the threshold for a match to survive is higher in recessions. This particular form of the decision rule causes discrete changes in employment distribution across di¤erent aggregate productivity levels. For instance, when productivity falls, all prevailing matches that have current priors below the new (and higher) threshold will be destroyed endogenously. Hence, some existing matches that are productive in expansions cease to be so in recessions, causing countercyclical job destruction.
The second important equation determining the equilibrium of this economy comes from the free entry condition and pins down the equilibrium number of vacancies posted. As it is shown in the appendix, the value of vacancy can be written as a function of the surplus function. It takes a simple form:
However, free entry of …rms imply that J u (z; n) = 0 for all z; n in equilibrium. Substituting this in (13) gives the second key condition describing the equilibrium.
Equations (11) and (14) jointly determine the equilibrium values for v(z; n) and (z; n).
These two equilibrium conditions are standard in models of labor market search with endogenous job destruction (Mortensen and Pissarides, 1994) . Given the law of motions G(n; z; z 0 ) and (z 0 jz) for the aggregate state, they characterize part of the equilibrium de…nition.
The rest of the equilibrium requires describing the endogenous equation of motion for the aggregate match quality distribution. Equilibrium de…nition requires that the decision rules determined by (11) and (14) should be consistent with the equation of motion for the match quality distribution, G(n; z; z 0 ). The presence of this distribution signi…cantly complicates the numerical solution. Thus, I leave the discussion of this last component of the equilibrium to the following section, which describes the practical challenges of the computational problem and the solution method employed.
Employment Flows
In order to shed more light on the mechanism advocated in this paper, it is essential to understand how match quality distribution evolves over time. Let n t 1 be the match quality distribution at the end of time period t 1. I assume that agents, both workers and …rms, are rational in their expectations about match quality. In other words, among the matches that are currently believed to be good with probability ; fraction of the good matches are indeed .
From any distribution n t 1 , decision rules v(z t ; n t ), ( ; z t ; n t ) and law of motion G(n t 1 ; z t 1 ; z t );
generate the employment distribution for time period t:
where g( ) denotes the pdf of the distribution function ( ); and 1 and 2 are de…ned as;
This recursive de…nition for employment distribution tracks down employment reallocation across di¤erent quality matches over time. To better understand the notation, it is helpful to think where workers should have been in the last period to end up in matches with a particular match quality . First of all, some fraction of workers with this match quality constitutes new hires from the unemployed. This corresponds to the last term in brackets in (15) . Previously unemployed workers meet a vacancy with probability f (v(z t ; n t )). Hence,
gives the total measure of unemployed who meet a vacancy this period.
Among them, only g( ) of them draws the prior ; and are candidates for a new match with quality in this period. However, the decision to form the match as a result of this meeting depends on the rule, ( ; z t ; n t ). This condition implies that overall number of new hires from the unemployment pool will be equal to:
f (v(z t ; n t )) (1
Flows into n t ( ) might also come from already employed workers. This group of workers have potentially di¤erent histories. For instance, some of them end up in n t ( ) after a jobto-job transition. On the other hand, a fraction of these already employed workers constitute participants of matches that endogenously update their posteriors to after output realizations in the last period. Let's consider matches which might improve their posteriors to , because they have recently experienced a good output realization. This happens to matches with 1 probability of being a good match in period t 1. Hence, they were part of n t 1 ( 1 ).
Only (1 ) ( 1 ) of n t 1 ( 1 ) experience high output and do not su¤er an exogenous match destruction. Some of the workers in these matches might not meet any other vacancy at all, which happens with the probability (1 f (v(z t ; n t )). The rest of them, however, might not be willing to change jobs even if they meet a new vacancy, which occurs with the probability f (v(z t ; n t )) ( 1 ). This completes the description of the …rst term within brackets in (15) .
The second term de…nes the measure of previously employed workers from matches that has experienced a low output in the last period and yet survived exogenous shocks.
The following two terms in (15) give the measure of workers who ended up in a match with match quality after quitting their previous matches. If these workers have recently experienced a high output in the last period, they could potentially come from the interval [0; 1 ]. Otherwise, they were part of the employment distribution over [0; 2 ]. Note that, employment distribution by the end of period t, should always take ( ; z t ; n t ) into account.
This part creates the separation that is endogenous.
The results in this paper show that most of the reallocation is undertaken through job-to-job transitions. A job-to-job transition necessarily implies a simultaneous separation and a new hire. Thus, it involves reallocating workers across matches. Recall that the beginning of period match quality distribution evolves from n t to n + t because of the new information revealed through production and endogenous separations at the beginning of the period. Then the probability that a worker who meets a vacancy accepts …rm's job o¤er is a function of the match quality distribution:
Computational Strategy
The …rst term in (18) gives the probability of meeting an unemployed worker and forming a match. Among those whom the …rm meets (which happens at the rate h(v) ) (1 R n + t ( )d ) are unemployed workers and they receive an initial signal. If it is above the reservation threshold,
, it is worth to form the match. This comes from the equilibrium decision rule ( ; z; n); which takes the value 1 for > and 0 otherwise. The second term in (18) gives the probability of meeting an employed worker and forming a match. Each worker who is in a match indexed by belief , will accept the …rm's match o¤er with probability 1 ( ).
This is why, for practical purposes, it is su¢ cient to have a simple probability in the state space instead of the match quality distribution. The computational algorithm I use to solve for the equilibrium of this economy involves an approximation of the law of motion for . So, even though the match quality distribution is changing over time, agents need to know how a simple moment of this distribution changes over time. For any equation of motion de…ned by G(n; z; z 0 ), there is an implied equation of motion for 13 . Let the equation of motion implied be H( ; z; z 0 ). Given this belief and the stochastic process for z, agents'problem could be solved using equilibrium conditions (11) and (14) . Solution to these equilibrium conditions lead to decision rules ( ; z; ) and v(z; ), which are now de…ned as a function of for practical purposes. Then, these decision rules, an initial condition for employment distribution, equation
of motion for employment, (5), and the de…nition for determine next period's probability 0 .
If this 0 is consistent with H( ; z; z 0 ), we arrive at the …xed point of the mapping from ( ; z; z 0 )
to 0 . The next step involves determining whether H( ; z; z 0 ) is a 'good' approximation for the underlying equation of motion, G(n; z; z 0 ). This ensures that agents lack of knowledge about the evolution of the match quality distribution causes only negligible errors in optimal decisions.
The precise algorithm for the computation of the equilibrium involves following steps:
1. Select N-point grid on , 2-point grid on z and M-point grid on .
2. Guess on a parameterized functional form for H( ; z; z 0 ) and on parameters of this function. Call thisĤ.
3. GivenĤ, guess a Nx2 vector, v(z; ) and solve the decision rule ( ; z; ) by Iterating over the surplus function de…ned in recursive equation (11) Computational results show that a linear functional form for 0 is a good guess. The details of this part of the computation is described in Section 7 below. Since computing H( ; z; z 0 )
is an important contribution of this paper and is not standard in this literature, a separate section within the main body of the paper is devoted to this computation.
Calibration
In order to understand the contribution of on-the-job search to ampli…cation, I calibrate a benchmark model, where there is no on-the-job search. This benchmark model is otherwise identical (preferences, production and matching technology) to the model presented in the preceding section. Hence, the benchmark model only has idiosyncratic match quality on top of the standard model. This helps to identify the e¤ect of on-the-job search. The time period is one month and is calibrated to match 4% annual interest rate. This implies that = 0:9967.
First step is to calibrate a productivity process. This is achieved by estimating a two state Markov-Chain approximation for the AR(1) process for the real output per worker in the nonfarm business sector. As Table 1 indicates, this productivity data has a standard deviation of 0:02 and a …rst order autocorrelation of 0:89. Since the standard deviation of this process will be a¤ecting the volatility of other variables directly, matching the exact standard deviation would be desired. Thus I …nd the following Markov process as the best approximation, which implies a standard deviation of 0:02 and a …rst order autocorrelation of 0:81.
(z t+1 jz t ) = , is chosen to be 0:36 (Shimer, 2005a) . The mean of the truncated normal density is set to 0, i.e. = 0. This is from Pries and Rogerson (2005) . I also normalize the value of the match speci…c output when it is low to 1, i.e. y l = 1.
The functional form for the constant returns to scale matching function is usually in CobbDouglas form in standard search models. However, since I have on-the-job search with a unit measure of search input, this particular form does not necessarily guarantee us a well de…ned meeting probability. In other words, f (v) and/or h(v) may not be well de…ned for some v.
Thus, I choose a di¤erent functional form for the matching function that has been used by Barlevy (2002) and den Haan et.al (2000) . Matching function takes the following simple form:
Equation ( In order to calibrate the rest of the parameters, I target three moments from the model; steady state unemployment rate of 5:68%, steady state job …nding probability of 45% and steady state probability of accepting a match conditional on meeting of 50%. The …rst two statistics are from the data. The latter statistic equals 1 ( ss ) and chosen to be in line with Pries and Rogerson (2005) . These targets imply a steady state monthly separation probability of 2:71%. This is slightly lower than the average separation probability in the U.S. data, which is 3:4%.
However, we cannot simultaneously match an average job …nding probability of 45% and an average separation probability of 3:4%. The exogenous job destruction probability, , is then calibrated to match the fraction of shutdowns among all job destruction. Davis et al. (1996) estimates that 11% of all job destruction is accounted for by shutdowns. Since all separations in the benchmark model's steady state are either exogenous (due to ) or due to learning about the quality of the match, a slightly higher value for this fraction is targeted. Speci…cally, it is assumed that 15% of all separations are exogenous. This pins down , which is set to 0:0041.
Since job …nding probability is f (v ss ) (1 ( ss ) ) in the steady state equilibrium of this benchmark economy, the target for 1 ( ss ) implies that v ss = 9. Given these targets, learning process can be calibrated to match them. For instance, the standard deviation of the distribution for prior signals, , implies an equilibrium value for ss if (1 ( ss ) ) = 0:5.
The value of ss does not have any intrinsic value for the purpose of this paper. Hence, I
target a value of 0:1 for this equilibrium value. This target and (1 ( ss ) ) = 0:5, implies that = 0:153. With the targets for ss and v ss and values for , and , the model can be easily simulated to generate a stationary match quality distribution. Only determinants of this equilibrium distribution are learning parameters g and b . Recall that these two parameters determine the pace of learning. There is no apriori reason to have a faster learning depending on the inherent quality. Hence, it is assumed in the simulations that both good matches and bad matches reveal the information at the same pace, i.e. b = g . Then, the average unemployment rate requires b = g = 0:598. It turns out that the benchmark model with these set of parameters actually imply a tenure distribution that is consistent with the U.S. data. This is not a dimension that I target, but the stationary match quality distribution determines how long each match is likely to survive. Taking this into account, the benchmark Calibrating a value for b is not straightforward. Recall that y l = 1. In this benchmark 1 4 The data could be found in Table 3 This justi…es adding z 0 (in addition to z) to the list of independent variables determining 0 .
Ultimately I use the following functional form.
Once there is a functional form guess for H( ; z; z 0 ) and an initial set of parameter values for 0 s, computation of the equilibrium starts by discretization of the state space ( ; z; ).
Aggregate productivity only takes two values, z h and z l . Match quality index is de…ned on a 250-point grid over the unit interval. I use M = 250 grid points because the grid on should be …ne enough to capture the underlying individual heterogeneity. This heterogeneity determines the exact value of the equilibrium condition (z; n) 15 . Finally, 's are assumed to take values between 0:13 and 0:19 and are equally spaced on 15 grid points 16 . The upper and lower bounds on are chosen such that at the simulation stage none of the realized (actual) values for fall out of this range.
Next step is to solve the recursive equations de…ned in (14) and (11) It turns out that agents do infer 0 with considerable precision when only ,z and z 0 are explanatory variables. Regression results from the simulations of the model is a standard way of measuring how good an approximation the equilibrium is (Krusell and Smith, 1998) . The 1 5 I have tried …ner grids, but they do not seem to lead to changes on the equilibrium values for (z; n). 1 6 Adding more grid points essentailly did not change the results at all. However, lowering the number of grids for will reduce the predictive power of the functional forms for states (z; z 0 ), where z 6 = z 0 . 1 7 Due to the persistence in z, these periods are very rare as opposed to periods when aggregate state does not change at all.
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following four equations show the extent of the …t. (2003) ). However, this paper provides a solution for the stochastic equilibrium allowing us to conduct a thorough business cycle analysis. These results are discussed in the next section. 1 8 Another measure of "goodness of …t" can be the discrepancy between the 0 s implied by H( ; z; z 0 ) and actual ones. It turns out that the maximum discrepancy in a period was 0.00087. Furthermore, this di¤erence was always less than 0.0007 in all but 9 periods (out of 15000).
Results
To understand the role of on-the-job search in generating labor market ampli…cation, both the benchmark model and the model with on-the-job search are simulated. Table 4 . presents the results from simulations of the model with on-the-job search. As it is evident from the reported standard deviations, the presence of on-the-job search creates signi…cant variations in our key labor market variables. Although the underlying aggregate productivity process is assumed to be the same, a comparison of Table 4 and either Table 2 Table 1 ). It also implies signi…cantly large variations in vacancies and market tightness, even though, they are a little far o¤ from the data. One might argue that, a direct comparison between Table 2, Table 3 and Table 4 is not reasonable. This is a legitimate concern, because the implied improvements in performance might be due to one (or more) of the several extensions inherent in the model presented in Simulation results for the benchmark model are presented in Table 5 19 . There are at least two important di¤erences between the benchmark model and the model with on-the-job search.
First of all, the standard deviations of the cyclical variations show signi…cant decline, especially for vacancies and vacancy-unemployment ratio. This proves that the relevant mechanism for the ampli…cation is on-the-job search. Another fact that stands out in Table 5 However, with endogenous separations due to low productivity, unemployment is also a¤ected by countercyclical separations. This dampens the magnitude of variations required in v in response to negative productivity shock. Since such a negative shock induces a sharp decline in u, the lower equilibrium value for v=u could be attained even with small changes (and in Table 4 with large declines) in v 21 .
On the other hand, the model with on-the-job search implies a much more realistic picture in this regard. In contrast to the benchmark model, the relevant equilibrium object is not v=u but only v. Hence, aggregate productivity ‡uctuations are accommodated through changes in the number of vacancies posted. But as argued in the rest of the discussion here, …rms' incentive to create vacancies respond to the behavior of expected job-to-job transitions. This is the channel which reverse the counterfactual implications of the benchmark model.
How does job-to-job transition create ampli…cation and help to reconcile endogenous separations with the Beveridge curve? The answer to this question lies at the heart of the model. These two di¤erent match quality distributions are shown in Figure ( ??). It is clear from the …gure that, in the high productivity steady state there are some employed workers in low quality matches, which would have been unpro…table otherwise. It also happens to be the case that, since employment is higher in high productivity steady state, there are uniformly more workers employed in each match quality level. Because, workers are better of by switching to new jobs with higher quality, the odds of quitting and changing a job would be higher in the high aggregate productivity state. This is crucial for the …rms that are considering to post vacancies. Remember that one critical object in the model was the value for , which summarized this probability. Two distributions pictured in Figure ( ??) clearly show why one should expect more workers to be willing to accept job o¤ers from vacancies. Hence, vacant …rms might expect to meet with workers that are more willing to change jobs and accept their o¤ers in expansions.
In the standard search model, when …rms intend to create vacancies due to high aggregate productivity, unemployment pool starts to shrink. Since new matches are formed only between vacancies and unemployed workers, as the high productivity prevails, …rms loose incentive to create any more vacancies due to smaller pool of potential matches. Here, however, high productivity state serves as a good opportunity for workers to reallocate themselves for better quality matches. This improved reallocation across matches also gives further incentive to …rms to create vacancies when aggregate productivity is high. Thus, the model implies a signi…cantly procyclical labor market reallocation through procyclical job-to-job transitions. This model's implications for labor market ‡ows are also instructive in this regard. First of all, by having the possibility of job-to-job transitions, the model has richer implications than the standard model. As Table 4 indicates, e-e ‡ows are signi…cantly procyclical and as variable as u-e ‡ows. On the other hand, the ‡ows from employment to unemployment is countercyclical as expected but has very large variation. The cyclicality of job-to-job transitions is in line with quits (Nagypal 2004a ). However, we need to be cautious when interpreting u-e ‡ows.
In theory, these separations happen with mutual consent, so it is neither layo¤ nor quit. If both e-u and e-e ‡ows are considered to be "separations", the enormous volatility in e-u does not carry over to all separations. This is due to the negative relationship between both ‡ows constituting "separation," i.e the procyclicality of e-e dampens the e¤ect of e-u.
Conclusion
The Mortensen-Pissarides labor market search model has been recently criticized because of the model's quantitative implications for business cycles. In particular, researchers have pointed out the discrepancy between the implied level of variation in unemployment, vacancies and market tightness and the observed variation in these variables in the United States. This paper extends the baseline labor market search model to include on-the-job search and match speci…c heterogeneity to generate the missing ampli…cation. The mechanism works through the e¤ects of aggregate productivity shocks on the entire employment distribution.
There is incomplete information about the quality of the employee-…rm match which provides persistence in employment relationships and the rationale for on-the-job search. Ampli…cation arises because productivity changes not only a¤ect …rms' probability of contacting unemployed workers but also of contacting already employed workers. Since the measure of workers in low quality matches is greater, this probability is higher during expansions. This introduces strongly procyclical labor market reallocation through procyclical job-to-job transitions, which has been a generally ignored feature in the literature. Hence, the model provides a possible channel which does not require changing the wage determination process or the information structure to a large extent to create more variation. In particular, simulations with a plausible forcing process show that the standard deviations for unemployment, vacancies and vacancy-unemployment ratio (market tightness) match the U.S. data. The model also reconciles the presence of endogenous separation with the negative correlation of unemployment and vacancies over business cycle frequencies.
This paper also has a methodological contribution. On-the-job search with match heterogeneity requires to take the entire employment distribution into account as part of the state space. It is well known in the literature that this complicates the numerical solution of the equilibrium. I adapt the algorithm used by Krusell and Smith (1998) to the problem described in this paper. The computational exercise suggests that approximating the worker's acceptance probability of a …rm's job o¤er su¢ ces to characterize the equilibrium. Other studies that have modeled on-the-job search either assumed simplifying assumptions to get rid of the endogenous e¤ects of heterogeneity or simply restricted the analysis to non-stochastic equilibrium.
Several possible variations of the model has been ignored in this paper. One key feature that should be considered is the e¤ect of strategic bargaining at the wage determination stage.
Incorporating such an additional feature might be a natural extension of the model to get wage rigidity and therefore might provide a comparison to the mechanism advocated here. I have also focused on the mechanism itself without much discussion on the implied magnitudes of the ‡ows. This is mostly the case, because the underlying calibration of the model does not target job-to-job ‡ow statistics from recent studies. These possible extensions are left for future research.
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. Appendix
A Standard Mortensen-Pissarides Model
In order to facilitate comparison the notation for describing the standard Mortensen-Pissarides model will be similar to the notation used in the model presented in section 4, whenever possible.
There is a continuum of risk neutral workers and employers who discount the future at the rate 2 (0; 1). The measure of workers is normalized to 1 and they are either unemployed looking for a job or employed and producing z t > 0 each period. All matches are identical.
Match output, z t ; is stochastic and governed by a Markov process, (z t+1 jz t ): There is no onthe-job search. Hence, only unemployed workers are searching for a job. Active …rms could be either producing by employing a worker, or waiting for a possible match after posting a vacancy.
There is free entry of …rms which guarantees that as long as the value of posting a vacancy is positive, there will be active …rms posting vacancies. Posting a vacacny costs c > 0 per period and enables vacant …rms to meet an unemployed worker through a matching function, M (v t ; u t ), where v t is the aggregate number of vacancies and u t is the aggregate number of unemployed workers. M (v; u) is constant returns to scale, which implies the following probabilities of …nding a job (for unemployed workers) and …lling a vacancy (for vacant positions).
f ( t ) = M (v t ; u t )=u t and h( t ) = M (v t ; u t )=v t where M (v t ; u t ) = M u Here t = v t =u t is usually referred to as market tightness. When unemployed, workers consume b > 0. Continuing matches are subject to exogenous destruction with probability each period: Wage, w(z t ), is determined each period via Nash bargaining between worker and …rm taking the threat points as value of unemployment and value of being a vacant job respectively. Let the value of being unemployed be V u (z t ) and the value of a vacancy be J u (z t ).
Similarly, the value of being employed for a worker and the value of being in a match for a …rm are denoted by V e (z) and J e (z) respectively. These value functions are summarized in four
Bellman equations:
V e (z) = w(z) + E z 0 jz (1
J u (z) = c + E z 0 jz h( (z))J e (z 0 ) + (1 h( (z))) J u (z 0 )
J e (z) = z w(z) + E z 0 jz (1 )J e (z 0 ) + J u (z 0 )
where time subscripts are dropped for convenience.
Consequently, the equilibrium of this economy satis…es the following conditions:
1. (Optimization) Given, (z) and w(z); value functions V u (z); V e (z); J u (z) and J e (z) satisfy (22) - (25).
2. (Free entry) Given (z) and w(z) a …rm is willing to post a vacany as long as J u (z) > 0:
Therefore in equilibrium, due to free entry J u (z) = 0. 
The simulations in Table 2 use the following calibration. 
B Surplus Function and Equilibrium Value of Vacancy
First, write down the values of J e ( ; z; n) J u (z; n) and V e ( ; z; n) V u (z; n) by subtracting (9) and (7) from (10) and (8) respectively.
The surplus sharing rule implies that V e ( ; z; n) V u (z; n) = S( ; z; n) for all ; z; n. This leads to following equalities:
Then the surplus function reduces to S( ; z; n) = max 
Now I need to use (7) to pin down the value of V u (z; n) + E z 0 jz V u (z 0 ; n 0 ) in terms of surplus function. It is possible by substituting V u (z; n) + S( ; z; n) for V e ( ; z; n), using the surplus sharing rule.
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And further simpli…cation of (33) yields the desired expression.
Substituting (34) 
On the other hand, one can write down the equilibrium value of vacancy as a function of the surplus function. This follows from the de…nition of (9) and surplus sharing rule, J e ( ; z; n) J u (z; n) = (1 ) S( ; z; n) for all ; z; n. Using these two conditions I arrive at the following condition expressed in the text as :
